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VERBAL ACTS AND SPONTANEOUS DECLARATIONS

By ROBimT E. IRBTON*
I.
Notwithstanding the multitude of American judicial decisions on the question of res gestae and declarations forming
part thereof, few may be found in which a definite, logical reason is given for the admission in evidence of such statements.
It is, of course, a simple matter for a judge to say that a statement, declaration or exclamation, subsequent to an act, is a part
of res gestae and therefore receivable in evidence. It is more
difficult to offer a convincing explanation. And it would seem
to be an utter impossibility for the average jurist to point out
a definite legal principle as a sanction for the action. Our
courts are not blameless for this unsatisfactory condition.
When the phrase was first used they knew that it was ambiguous, yet few attempted to analyze it, accepting its application
in the first cases in which it appeared as a sort of reliable certification of its authenticity and wide coverage. Let an event,
happening, occurence or disaster be presented for judicial inquiry, and let it embrace a declaration, proximate or remote, the stage was set immediately for the employment of this
unintelligible phrase, which other high priests in the temple of
justice had read into the law's ritual, and presto! an intellectual prostration seemed to follow, while a judicial chorus, in
ever ascending and increasing volume, rose up in praise of the
empiric novelty.
That original and independent facts are admissible in proof
of an issue is a principle so fundamental as to need no comment; yet when the question of admissibility involves a declaration and an act to which it is proximately or remotely related,
the basic rule is so frequently disregarded and the talismanic
res gestae seized upon as the solution, it seems, the foreign
* Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Detroit; formerly
taught law at the A. E. F. University at Beaune, France, and in the
army schools at Coblenz, Germany, and at Portia Law School at Boston,
Mass. Former legal adviser at the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission at Coblenz and Assistant Judge Advocate at Headquarters of
A. E. F. in Germany.
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phrase is to lawyers and judges what the adverb is to all philologists-a common sink: Any word which defies classifieation
otherwise is an adverb; a declaration of questionable admissibility is res gestael

To define precisely this foreign expression is clearly
beyond the range of either legal skill or judicial ability. Implanted in our system of jurisprudence for approximately
three centuries,1 it has caused more argument, as to its meaning
and scope, and more diversity in judicial utterance than any
other single question known to the common law. Truly may it
be said that it is a question upon which no principle has been
stated with authority, and is one upon which single judges have
given different opinions. It is an indefinite, inexact and vagiie
expression and should never have been admitted to our legal
terminology. An alien product of the civilians, it has no rightful place in English law, and, had it been in vogue in the year
1236, it would have been cast forth by the stern men of Merton,
who emphatically declared that English law should remain
unchanged.2
Although Hampden's counsel used the phrase with seeming familiarity and with no attempt to explain it, in the case
cited, from which it might be inferred that it was not a stranger
to the ears of the Exchequer judges on that historic occasion,
no one seems to have unearthed its subsequent employment for
more than a century and a half. Then it came to light in the
trial of Home Tooke for high treason, in 1794. 3 It found favor
SProceedlngs in the Case of Ship-Money, between the King and
John Hampden, Esq., in the Exchequer, 13 Charles I. a. d. (1637), 3
Howell's State Trials 825, 988. In the second day argument of Mr.
Holborne, on behalf of Mr. Hampden, on page 988, he states, "My
Lords, to prove this is an act, Walsingham entered it in his time, who
did not write very long after it. Though it hath been said that he
was a monk, and what he wrote he took up in the street and market
place; yet I will not think so of Walsingham, who was ever held ani
historian of very great credit. And no historian whatsoever durst
set down any thing for an act of parliament, if he had not a sure warrant for It. It had been little less than forgery.
"In the next place it hath been said, histories are no good authorities in law. True, they shall not tell me what the law is, yet they are
good to tell us of res gestae, whether or no there hath been such things
done."
'Provisions of Merton, enacted by the King, in 1236, with the consent of the nobles and prelates.
' 25 Howell's State Trials 1. In the Trial of John Home Tooke,
Clerk, for High Treason, before the Court holden under a Special Com-
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with our own jurists in the beginning of the nineteenth century
and is today a fixture in our modern law of judicial evidence.
Gilbert, who gave us our first book on Evidence, in 1726, did
4
not mention it, probably because he knew nothing about it.
Peake, his immediate successor as a writer on that subject, was
equally oblivious.5 Phllips was next to write and he was
plainly in a quandary. He found the phrase both troublesome
and refractory. In his first edition we find it used, abandoned
in the second and succeeding editions, but readopted in the
eighth.6 It was used freely by all later writers 7-with one exception. That was Stephen, whose knowledge of the Law of
Evidence has never been surpassed. He dismissed the expression res gestae with the caustic -criticism that it was a term
"of convenient obscurity," and avoided its use in his valuable
Digest, preferring the sensible and intelligible word "transaction", in his discussion of the basic doctrine of relevant
8
facts.
Phillips had also used this word, when he had made the
change previously mentioned, and had he continued to use it
instead of the expression res gestae, our situation in the present
might be less confusing. Phillips gave the profession an excellent treatise-in fact, the, first that could be styled authoritative
and it is more than likely that the writers who came after him
would have followed his well-beaten path. Not one of them but
understood the definite legal meaning of the word "transaction," but the same cannot be inferred concerning their acquaintance with our civilian borrowing, res gestae. Best perceived in its use a frequent source of error through mistaking
hearsay for original evidence. 9
mission of Oyer and Terminer, at the Sessions House in the Old Bailey,
on the Monday 17th, Tuesday 18th, Wednesday 19th, Thursday 20th,
Friday 21st, and Saturday 22nd, of November: 35 George III. a. d. 1794.
Mr. Garrow, counsel for the Crown, on page 440 states: "That letter
your lordships have received, and, I believe, without any objection
from this side of the table, probably upon the ground, that as It Is an
answer to an act which is charged against the prisoner, it Is fit to be
received as part of the res gestae upon the subject!"
'Lord Chief Baron Gilbert. The Law of Evidence. 1726.
Thomas Peake. The Law of Evidence. 1801.
'S. March Phillips. A Treatise on the Law of Evidence. 1819. Vol.
1, 202.
Starke, Best, Taylor, Greenleaf,
'Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. Digest of the Law of Evidence.
2nd Am. ed., article 3, 8.
1 W. M. Best. Law of Evidence, Vol. 2, section 495, 6th ed.
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Holdsworth makes no reference to the doctrine of res gestae,
in his able and well-documented chapters on the rise and meaning of evidence, although he discusses the question of relevancy
at some length, and emphasizes the principles of reasoning as
the groundwork of the Law of Evidence.1 0 In Halsbury's great
work there is but brief mention of it and little discussion.:1 He
says: "Pacts which form part of the res gestae, and are consequently provable as facts relevant to the issue, include acts,
declarations, and incidents which themselves constitute, or accompany and explain the facts or transaction in issue." Again,
he writes: "These constituent or accompanying incidents are
in law said to be admissible as forming part of the res gestae or
main fact; and when they consist of declarations accompanying
an act, are subject to three important qualifications: (1) They
must not be made at such an interval as to allow of fabrication,
or to reduce them to the mere narrative of a past event; (2)
they must relate to, and can only be used to explain, the act they
accompany, and not independent facts prior or subsequent
thereto; and (3) though admissible to explain, or corroborate,
they are not, in general, to be taken as any proof of the truth of
the matters stated: they are consequently not in any sense, to
12
be classified as exceptions to the hearsay rule.
1*0Professor W. C. Holdsworth. History of English Law, Vol. 9,
127, 1926.
Earl of Halsbury. Laws of England, Vol. 13, 529. 2nd ed., 1934.
I Rouch v. Great Western Railway Co. (1841), 1 Q. B. 51, 113 Eng-

lish Reports, 1049; Thompson v. Trevanion (1693), Skin. 402; 14 Dig.
397, 4172; The Schwalbe (1859), Sw. 521, 523, 166 E. R. 1244 (collision
action: statement by pilot after his ship was cut away and while she
was backing, "The damned helm is still astarboard," received);
Agassiz v. London Tramway Co. (1872), 21 W. R. 199; 22 Dig. 58, 821
(action against tramway company for injury to passenger: remark by
fellow passenger to conductor, a few minutes after the collision: "The
driver ought to be reported" and the conductor's reply, "He has already
been reported, for he has been off the line five or six times today,"
rejected, the transaction being over, and the remark referring not to
the res, but to the past acts of the driver); Tustin v. Arnold & Sons
(1915), 84 L. J. (M. B.) 2214; 22 Dig. 92, 622 (a written statement
made by the driver of a vehicle after a collision with another is not a
part of the res gestae, I. e. the collision, so as to make it admissible in
evidence In proceedings concerning the accident in which the driver's
employer is a party). "In such a case words, even spoken words, do
not become part of the res gestae, unless they are made at the time and
are the natural consequences of the collision-words which spring out
of the fact of the collision, so to speak-inevitably and almost without
the will of the speaker, and are at any rate, spontaneous ....

If I

have correctly stated the characteristics which words must have in
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Swift, who was America's first writer on the Law of Evidence, makes mention of this foreign phrase;", but it proved

altogether too much for our perspicacious and usually meticulous Greenleaf. His attempt to explain it is, perhaps, the outstanding weakness of his great work.14 In approaching it he
displays a hesitation and an uncertainty not elsewhere noticeable in his learned and convincing discussion. Professor Wigmore has criticized Greenleaf's explanation and-what is infinitely worse-holds that the cases resting on it are lacking in
principle and without basis.1 5 Thayer had a lively contempt
order to form part of the res gestae of a collision, it follows that a
written statement can never do so."-Bailhache, J., at page 2216.
Holmes v. Newman (1931), 2 Ch. 112 (action to establish charge on
land by deposit of title deeds: Memorandum signed contemporaneously
with and to record delivery of deeds, admitted); Smith v. Blakey
(1867), L. R. 2 Q. B. 326; 22 Dig. 105, 754 (question as to terms on
which A's country agent bought goods from B: letter to A by the
agent, immediately after the sale, stating the terms, rejected); Regina
v. Bedingfield (1879), 14 Cox C. C. 341; 14 Dig 397, J1175 (charge of
murder: exclamation of deceased, while rushing with her throat cut
out of a house entered by prisoner a minute or two before, of "Oh,
aunt, see what Bedingfield has done to me," rejected, the transaction
being over). In R. v. Bedingfield, supra, Cockburn, C. J., is generally
considered to have applied the rule too strictly; on the other hand, the
dictum of Lord Denman, C. J., in Rouch v. Great Western Rail. Co.,
supra, that "concurrence of time, though material is not essential,"
seems to err in the opposite direction, the weight of authority favoring
a substantial, though not a literal contemporaneousness. Where, however, the act is of a continuous nature, declarations made at any time
during its currency may properly be received. Doucet v. Geoghegan
(1878), 9 Ch. Div. 441, C. A.; Re Grove, Vaucher v. Treasury Solicitor
(1838). 40 Ch. Div. 216, C. A.
23Swift's Digest of the Law of Evidence in Civil and Criminal
Cases, 127, 1810.
S "There are other declarations which are admitted as original evidence, being distinguished from hearsay by their connection with the
principal fact under investigation. The affairs of men consist of a
complication of circumstances so intimately interwoven as to be hardly
separable from each other. Each owes its birth to some preceding circumstance, and in its turn becomes the prolific parent of others; and
each, during its existence, has its inseparable attributes and its kindred
facts, materially affecting its character, and essential to be known in
order to a right understanding of its nature. These surrounding circumstances, constituting parts of the res gestae, may always be shown
to the jury along with the principal fact, and their admissibility Is determined by the judge according to the degree of their relation to that
fact, and in the exercise of his sound discretion; it being extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to bring this class of cases within the limits
of a more particular description."--Dr. Simon Greenleaf. Evidence,
Vol. I, Sec. 108.
25Professor John H. Wigmore. Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1757.
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for the phrase and for its possibilities for error ;16 and Wigmore
believes that it has no place in the Law of Evidence and serves
17
no useful purpose.
That the authority which first used this expression had an
opportunity to say what it meant, goes without question; but
that the English jurist was reluctant to commit himself is altogether too evident. We know that, as late as the year 1837,
Mr. Justice Bosanquet asked: "How do you translate res
gestae, gestae, by whom?" He was answered by another eminent jurist: "The acts by whomsoever done are res gestae, if
relevant to the matter in issue. But the question is, what facts
are relevant?'"'1
From this, we may assume, that, although
the expression had been in use since Home Tooke's case, or for
more than forty years, its vagueness had not been reduced to
certainty, nor had any attempt been made to define it. And
whatever its scope and meaning might prove to be, that the
English jurist was going to adhere to Relevancy, as his test of
admissibility, is fairly deducible from the utterances quoted.
That was an established principle with which he was familiar,
and he had neither inclination nor desire to limit its usefulness
and indispensability in the trial of disputed causes, by undue
emphasis upon an inexplicit foreign phrase, which added noth'" "If it is true, as it seems to be, that the phrase (res gestae) first
came into use in evidence near the end of the last century, one would
like to know what started the use of it just then. That is matter for
conjecture rather than opinion. It would seem probable that it was
called into use mainly on account of its 'convenient obscurity.' . . . The
law of hearsay at that time was quite unsettled; lawyers and judges
seem to have caught at the term 'res gestae,' . . . which was a foreign
term, a little vague in its application, and yet in some applications of
it precise,-they seem to have caught at this expression as one that
gave them relief at a pinch. They could not, in the stress of business,
stop to analyze minutely; this valuable phrase did for them what the
limbo of the theologians did for them, what a 'catch-all' does for a
busy housekeeper or an untidy one-some things belonged there, other
things might for purposes of present convenience be put there. We
have seen that the singular form of phrase soon began to give place
to the plural; this made it considerably more convenient; whatever
multiplied its ambiguity multiplied its capacity; it was a larger 'catchall'. To be sure, this was a dangerous way of finding relief, and
judges, text-writers, and students have found themselves sadly embarrassed by the growing and intolerable vagueness of the expression."
-Professor James B. Thayer, American Law Review, Vol. XV, 5, 81;
1881.
-"Professor John H. Wigmore. Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1767.
",Wright v. Doe, 7 A. & E. 353, 112 E. R. 488; 4 Bing. N. C. 548,
132 E. R. 877; Stephen, op. cit. Appendix of Notes, 5.
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ing of value to the Law of Evidence. Comment has been made
upon the infrequency of cases involving declarations to prove
objective facts in the English reports. 19 An explanation might
be found in the consistent attitude of English jurists to deal
with such questions on the basis of relevancy alone and to avoid
in every case possible a reference to an inexact and misleading
expression.
Indeed, this disinclination on the part of the English jurist
to use the expression is manifest from the very beginning. Said
Mr. Justice Williams: "Declarations accompanying acts are a
wide field of evidence and to be carefully watched.' 20 No blind
or hurried acceptance of res gestae, here ! In a celebrated case,
previously cited, Mr. Justice Coltman said: "When an act
done is evidence per se, a declaration accompanying that act
may well be evidence if it reflects light upon it or qualifies the
act.''21 Midtum in parvo. In a few but clear and convi~acing
words this learned jurist gives us the basic doctrine of verbal
acts, without reference to the barbarous res gestae. And
Starkie showed similar caution in avoiding it. Said he: "Declarations accompanying an act, when the nature and quality
of that act are in question, are either to be regarded as part of
the act itself, or as the best and most proximate evidence of its
nature and quality. ' 1 2 In a case, involving the price to be paid
for sheep sold to defendant, declarations of the latter's wife in
paying plaintiff's agent for the sheep were received as verbal
acts. 23 So, where a letter accompanied a promissory note, the
declarations in the former were received to explain the writer's
purpose.241 But, perhaps, no case shows the English jurist's
aversion to the res gestae doctrine more convincingly than
Regina v. Bedingfield.25 Therein, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn
rejected a declaration because "it was not part of anything
done, or something said while something was being done, but
something said after something done."
Here, the declaration was an utterance of a victim of a
' Professor Edward W. Hinton. Cases on Evidence, 615 n.
"IQueen v. Bliss, 7 A. & E. at 566 (1837), 122 E. R. 577.

'Wright v. Tatham, supra, at 361.
= Thomas Starkie. Law of Evidence, Vol. 1, *62, 7th Am. ed.
=Walters v.-Lewis, 7 C. & P. 344 (1836), 173 E. R. 153.
' 4 Bruce v. Hurly, 1 Starkie's C. 23 (1814), 171 E. R. 390.
214 Cox C. C. 341 (1879). Vide, 14 Am. L. Rev. 817.
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murderous assault, as she ran from her assailant, but the brief
interval of time, between the infliction of the wound and the
utterance, negatived the assumption that the declaration was a
verbal act, that is, a part of the principal act. Lord Cockburn
was strictly logical in his reasoning and wholly consistent with
the English judicial view that declarations should be "carefully
watched," and admitted only when a part of an act. If we
translate res gestae as "things done," then, a declaration which
is a verbal act is beyond question a part of the "thing done," or
transaction, because it is a verbal part of the act in question.
In such a case, it is original evidence, admissible in proof of the
issue. Hence, to speak of such a declaration as part of the res
gestae would be precise. But the real ground of admissibility
for such a declaration is its logical relationship to the principal
act, which it accompanies and explains; in other words, its relevancy. On this ground alone there never is-and never
was-a reason for the introduction of the foreign phrase discussed as a factor in judicial decision; and one has read without
profit or discovery, the English judicial opinions hereon, if he
has failed to realize a deep-rooted purpose among their writers
to let Relevancy be their guide in all questions of admissibility.
II.
In the year 1808, in what is believed to be the earliest
American case 26 in which the expression res gestea appears,
counsel argued that declarations made long after a deed had
been executed, and not at the time of signing, could not be admitted as part of the res gestae. His use of the phrase in this
connection was correct, for he clearly intimates that such a
declaration to be admissible should be precisely concurrent with
the principal act and constitute a verbal part of it. The court
did not mention the phrase but upheld counsel's contention
plainly on the ground of relevancy. A few years later, in 1820,
Chief Justice Hosmer, of Connecticut, refused to receive declarations made by a witness after a note had been given, as not
27
having been made "at the time of the act done."
Bartlet v. Delprat, 4 Mass. 702 (1808).
v. Tuttle, 3 Conn. 247 (1820). Vide, also, Mima Queen v.
Hepburn, 7 Cranch 290 1813), and The King v. Eriswell, 3 T. R. 707
(1790); 100 E. R. 815. In this case there is a very sound discussion of
hearsay, at a period when that rule had not been fully developed.
2'Enos
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In 1823, the meaning of res gestae was well understood in
North Carolina. In his argument, that year, in Cherry v.
Slade,2s Mr. Gaston (afterward Judge) opposing the admission
of certain declarations, said: "It is sometimes said that there
is an exception when words are the res gestae or part of reg
gestae. But this seems not to be accurate. The words ave
there received, not as evidence of the truth of what was declared,
but because the speaking of the words is the fact, or part of the
fact, to be investigated . . . The words spoken concurrently
with an act done are often a part of the act, and give it a precise and peculiar character, and therefore must be testified, not
to show that the words spoken are true, but to show that they
were in fact spoken."
In 1826, Massachusetts had to pass on this question again,
and it adhered to the principle earlier expressed. It admitted
declarations of one, who had absconded, while doing an act,
saying: "This was an act or transaction, and Schofield's declarations made a part of it."29 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine was equally clear on this question. In 1828, it held admissible declarations of a pauper on leaving one place for
another, the court saying: "His intention can be known only
to himself, except so far as it is communicated by his declarations. And these declarations are legal evidence of his intention. *When it is necessary to show the nature of an act, or the
intention with which it is done, proof of what was said by the
party, at the time of doing the act is admissible. "o
Another New England tribunal, the Supreme Court of Judicature of New Hampshire, in 1835, affirmed a lower court's
ruling, admitting declarations of a servant at the time of leaving his employer, on the ground that they were so connected
with his act as to derive a degree of credit therefrom and
become a part of the transaction. 3 1 Chancellor Walworth, of
New York, made a similar ruling, in 1842, saying: "Declarations of parties and other attending circumstances, in order to
render them admissible in evidence as a part of the res gestae,
22 Hawks 400 (1823).
Wigmore, Cases on Evidence, No. 398.
Third edition, 1932.
2!Pool v. Bridges, 4 Pick. 378 (1826).
N Inhabitants of Gorham v.
Inhabitants of Canton, 5 Greenl. 266
(1828), 17 Am. Dec. 231.
n Harley v. Carter, 8 N. H. 40 (1835).
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must be contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration and to which they are intended to give character."13 2 The
same question of principle is found, in 1847, in a decision of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, where declarations
were held to be unimportant because they "were not made by a
party while doing any act, but were a recital of past transactions and past purposes. ' " 33 In the same year, a Georgia opinion held that declarations of a party are not admissible unless
they grow out of the principal transaction, illustrate its char4
acter and are contemporary with it.3
In 1851, the Massachusetts court of last resort delivered a vigorous opinion involving
the nature of res gestae. In excluding the declarations of a deceased physician, who had examined the plaintiff, after the accident in which she had been injured, the court said: "It is a
well-established principle of the law, that declarations which
form part of the res gestae and are to be considered as a part of
the transaction, do not come under the head of hearsay, but are
admissible as original evidence.'' 35
The Court of Appeals of New York, in 1858, made a correct ruling with reference to declarations of an agent to bind
his principal. Said the court: "Were his acts will bind, his
statements and admissions respecting the subject-matter of
those acts will also bind the principal, if made at the same time
and so that they constitute a part of the resgestae. To be admissible they must be in the nature of original and not of hearsay evidence." '36 Chief Justice Redfield of Vermont, in 1859,
in passing on the admissibility of declarations of a woman as to
the purpose of an intended journey, which journey was completed, said: "The declarations were of the same force as the
act of going, and were admissible as part of the act.' '37 And to
the same effect is the opinion of Chief Justice Beasley of New
Jersey, in 1878, who said the test of admissibility was the coincidence of the declaration with the act in such a way "as to
have become incorporated with it."38

12In

the Matter of Taylor, 9 Paige *617 (1842).
Inhabitants of Salem v. Inhabitants of Lynn, 13 Metc. 544 (1847).
"Carter v. Buchannon, 3 Ga. 513 (1847).
Lund v. Inhabitants of Tyngsborough, 9 Cush. 36 (1851).
"Luby v. Hudson River Railroad Company, 17 N. Y. 131 (1858).
State v. Howard, 32 Vermont 380, at 401 (1859).
"Hunter v. State of New Jersey, 40 N. J. L. 495 (1878). Said the
u
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In these early American decisions, representative of judicial opinion in several states, there is substantial uniformity of
principle. They all emphasize the doctrine of contemporaneousness of act with statement or declaration, to render the latter
admissible. In other words, the principle they unfold is what
in modern phraseology, would be termed a "verbal act," that
is, a precisely contemporaneous part of the main act or transaction. This is not clearly understood by some of our jurists,
who seem to think that any declaration admitted as "part of the
res gestae," is an exception to the Hearsay rule. In numerous
decisions what was plainly original evidence-declarations constituting verbal acts-was admitted as if it were hearsay but
was saved by virtue of the magic coverage of "res gestae."
Hence we find contradictory explanations in different jurisdictions. To illustrate, the Supreme Court of Illinois says:
"Statements, however, made by an injured party which form a
part of the res gestae, constitute an exception to the general rule and
are admitted, etc."'9

On the other hand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts correctly states the principle thus:
"It is a well established principle of the law, that declarations
which form a part of the res gestae and are to be considered as a part
under the head of hearsay, but are
of the transaction, do not come
''
admissible as original evidence."

Lord Halsbury's statement of the rule41 and Mr. Gaston's explanation, previously mentioned, 42 coincide with the Massachusetts opinion, and afford the only correct solution. To cite numerous cases showing wide divergence in judicial opinion on the
question discussed herein, would be a task of supererogation.
Chief Justice: "In the present instance the test thus indicated will be
found, I think, in the rule that such declarations as these are admissible, because they are so connected with an act, itself admissible as
a part of the res gestae, as to have become incorporated with it. The
declaration and the act must make up one transaction. The theory
justifying this course is that, when such declarations are thus coupled
with a provable act, they receive confirmation from it; but if they
stand alone, without such support, they depend altogether for their
credence on the veracity of the utterer, and thus conditioned, they are
pure hearsay, and inadmissible."
I Greinke v. Chicago City Railway Company, 234 Ill. 564, 85 N. E.
327 (1908).
" Lund v. Inhabitants of Tyngsborough, supra, note 35.
4 Supra, note 11.
1Supra, note 28.
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It would be to labor a point unhappily too well known to the
profession at large. But what the bench has said thereon, to a
limited extent, may be set down. At an early date, 1826, Chief
Justice Parker, of Massachusetts, said: "But where declarations are admitted as part of the res gestae, there is hardly any
distinct rule as to what will constitute the res gestae which will
support such declarations. ' 14
Chief Justice Beasley, of New
Jersey, in 1878, with the added guidance of half a century's
ruling wrote: "Now I think I may safely say that there are
few problems involved in the law of evidence more unsolved
than what things are to be embraced in these occurences that
are designated in the law as the res gestae. The adjudications
on the subject, more especially those in this country, are perplexingly variant and discordant. I can readily find judicial
rulings by force of which this testimony would be excluded; but
I can as readily find other rulings of equal weight, that would
sanction its admission. This result has grown out of the difficulty of applying, with anything like precision, general rules
to a class of cases of infinite variety." 4 4 Said Chief Justice
Bleckley, of Georgia, in 1879: "The difficulty of formulating
a description of the res gestae which will serve for all cases
seems insurmountable. To make the attempt is something like
trying to execute a portrait that shall enable the possessor to
'recognize every member of a very numerous family." '45 From
Mr. Justice Wanamaker, of Ohio, as recently as 1914, in reversing the Court of Appeals, on an evidentiary issue involving
res gestae, comes, an apology which is pregnant: "We feel
however, that it is but just to say that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in this case finds abundant warrant in the
former decisions of this court in analagous cases.'' 4 6
Much confusion has resulted in a regrettable tendency
"Pool v. Bridges, supra, note 29.

"Hunter v. State of New Jersey, supra, note 38.
"Cox v. State, 64 Ga. 374, 410.

"State v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio 10, 106 N. E. 660, L. R. A. 1915 E, 203,
Am. Cas. 1916 C, 1182. For conflicting views in relatively similar factsituations, vide: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397, 19 L. Ed.
437; Selz-Schwab & Co. v. Ind. Com., 326 Ill. 120, 156 N. E. 763; Railroad v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99; Railroad v. Coyle, 55 Pa. 396; Waldele v.
Railroad, 95 N. Y. 275; Luby v. Railroad, 17 N. Y. 131; McCarrick v.
Kealy, 70 Conn. 642, 40 Atl. 603; Morse v. Railway, 81 Conn. 395, 71
Atl. 533; Perry v. Haritos, 100 Conn. 476, 124 Atl. 44; Rockbill v. Bus.
Co., 109 Conn. 706, 145 Atl. 504.

K. . J.-3
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among jurists to "overexplain" in interpreting the res gestae
doctrine. Their language is frequently erroneous. They seem
to borrow, without discrimination, from precedents that sound
persuasively convincing, and thus we find language identified
with the verbal act theory employed to admit a spontaneous
declaration or exclamation. Such a foggy perspective is due to
plain misunderstanding. A declaration which is a verbal act
accompanies a principal act as an inseparable part of it, is precisely contemporaneous therewith, and is never offered as a testimonial assertion but only as a part of the act in issue. A
spontaneous declaration is always offered in a testimonial sense,
to wit: as the true explanation of the subject of inquiry. It is
because of this characteristic that it infringes the Hearsay rule.
The declaration constituting a verbal act serves merely to characterize, explain or elucidate a principal act, so as to show its
true nature or quality. Such a declaration is in no sense hearsay, but is always original evidence. It is either material to the
issue, a part of the issue, or circumstantial evidence of an existing condition. To the elements of contemporaneousness and
characterization, there is added another pre-requisite to make
a declaration a verbal act: the principal act must be equivo47
cal.
An illustration of the "over-explanation" referred to may
be found in the courts' reasoning in Correirav. Boston Moter
Tours, Inc., which leaves one in doubt as to whether the declaration was admitted because it was a verbal act and, therefore,
res gestae, or because it was a spontaneous exclamation made
without reflection or fabrication. The opinion writer, with
questionable generosity, blends indiscriminately the reasoning
of both principles. Said he:
"In view of the high degree of care owed the plaintiffs by the defendant, it was admissible as a part of the res gestae because it was
contemporaneous with the collision, was spontaneous to a degree which
reasonably negatived premeditation or possible fabrication, and tended
to qualify, characterize and explain the causal relation, if any, between
the accident and the conduct of the operator of the omnibus immedi4, State Bank v. Hutchinson, 62 Kan. 9, 61 Pac. 443; State v. Wentworth, 27 N. H. 217; Lund v. Tyngsborough, 9 Cush. 42; Ins. Co. v.
Mosley, 8 Wall. 411, 19 L. Ed. 437; 22 C. J. 259, sec. 362; Holyoke v. Est.
of Holyoke, 110 Maine 469, 87 Atl. 40; State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312,
73 Pac. 562; Gresham v. Manning, Irish Rep. 1 C. L. 125; Com. v.
Chance, 174 Mass. 245; Avery v. Clemons, 18 Conn. 306; Halsbury, op.
cit., supra, note 11; Wigmore, op. cit., 1772.
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ately before the accident, and thereby to throw light upon the issue of
whether or not the driver exercised the highest degree of care for the
safety of the plaintiffs, which was consistent with the defendant's
undertaking.""

Surely, the force of reasoning could not further go!
Just when the "broadening" of the rule began is problematical, but Mr. Justice Thayer puts the blame on a case decided
in Massachusetts in 1849. Said he: "The line of authorities in
this country which maintain its admissibility seems to have commenced with the case of Commonwealth v. McPike, 3 Cushing
184. The courts that have followed the ruling in that case have
frequently manifested a sort of hesitancy as to its correctness,
but have concluded that such statements were a part of the res
gestac, and been content to place their decisions on that
ground.' '4
This case and another, Commonwealth v.
Hackett,5" decided in 1861, also by Massachusetts, certainly
paved the way for much loose judicial reasoning and numerous
erroneous opinions, in the last seventy-five years. The declaration admitted "as part of the res gestae," in each case, was
plainly hearsay, and did not accompany the act. If receivable
at all, it should have been admitted as a spontaneous exclamation, and, then, only as an exception to the Hearsay rule. There
will be found in every jurisdiction, today, lawyers who were
grounded in their student days, in the belief that the McPike
and Hackett cases were the clearest illustrations in the books of
res gestae, while the Bedingfield ruling, supra, was an inexcusable error.
But other important decisions and judicial observations
contributed likewise. And among these a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States went far afield to widen the
"270 Mass. 88 (1930), 169 N. E. 775.
"Sullivan v. Oregon R. & N. Co., 12 Ore. 392 (1885), 53 Am. Rep.
364. Joseph Thayer offered this sapient advice:
"It occurs to me that courts at nisi prils would have but little
difficulty in determining when the statements of a party in such cases
were admissible as a part of the res gestae, or incompetent upon the
ground that they were only hearsay, if they would consider whether
the transactions to which they were relating were continuous when
they were made, or terminated at the time, and make that the test of
the matter; and I believe that much of the embarrassment they labor
under in applying the rule in such cases, has arisen in consequence of
an attempt that has frequently been made to stretch the res gestae
doctrine to an unnatural extent in order to suit some supposed meritorious case, and which has led to the great diversity of decisions and
confusion of the law upon the subject."
2 Allen 136 (1861).
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breach. 51 In that case, the court held that statements made by
a husband to his wife, who had left his bed between twelve and
one o'clock, and later returned, to the effect, that he had fallen
down the back stairs and almost killed himself, were admissible
as a part of the res gestae. The court did not concern itself
with the important fact that, apart from this recital of declaration by one deceased, there was no proof whatever of a "principal act" in this case. Furthermore, the opinion declared:
" ... The tendency of recent adjudications is to extend rather
than to narrow, the scope of the doctrine." The opinion writer
was influenced, doubtless, by an observation of Mr. Justice Park,
in 1824, in the famous English case of Rawson v. Haigh,52 as to
the admissibility of declarations of a bankrupt who had departed the realm to escape his creditors, while his absence continued. Said the English jurist: "It is impossible to tie down
to time the rule as to the declarations; we must judge from all
the circumstances of the case; we need not go the length of saying, that a declaration made a month after the fact would of
itself be admissible; but if, as in the present case, there are
connecting circumstances, it may, even at that time, form part
of the whole res gestae." Of course the declarations of the
bankrupt therein were admissible, for they accompanied and explained his flight, which was one continuous act from the
moment of his departure until his return. They were the verbal
parts of that single act. This feature, however, has been overlooked by courts, who regarded merely the first sentence quoted,
and missed the context which made it clear. A striking illustration of judicial misunderstanding on this very point will be
found in Keyser v. Grand Trunk Rai7road,5 3 in which the Supreme Court of Michigan held a report made by an engineer in line of duty, concerning an accident caused iby the locomotive operated by him, close to an hour after the accident in
question, admissible as part of the res gestae!
aTravelers' Ins. Co. v. Mosely, 8 Wall. 397, 19 L. Ed. 437 (1869).
632 Bing. 99.
For an intelligent and discriminating
566 Mich. 390 (1887).
opinion, vide Stewart v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 670, 32 S. W. (2d) 29
(1930), in which Stanley, C., discusses the relevancy of several declarations of the victim of a shooting affray, all made after the occurrence
and over a period of several hours. These statements involved a consideration of res gestae, spontaneous declarations, and as well that
shadowy distinction between fact and opinion.

VEaBnri AcTS AND SPONTAN-EOUS DECLARATiONS

III.
In the earliest case on the subject of spontaneous declarations, decided in the King's Bench, in 1694, 54 an exclamation of
a victim of mayhem, "immediate upon the hurt received, and
before that she had time to devise or contrive any thing for her
own advantage," was received in evidence. The objectionable
phrase, res gestae, was not employed, but the court gave full
recognition to the spontaneous character of the victim's exclanation or statement, and no court in any jurisdiction today, where
the common law is respected, would question the correctness of
this ruling. No better example, or illustration, of spontaneity
may be found in the books, and the res gestae doctrine was not
the sanction for the admissibility of the victim's observation. If
such statements were admitted in evidence generally, because
of their spontaneity, although subsequent to the main fact, as
a genuine and recognized exception to the Hearsay rule and not
on any other ground, our difficulty would be largely surmounted.
This element of spontaneity involves a consideration of certain
factors which must be present to warrant its inference. As to
this there is practical unanimity: The declaration must be
made at the moment of the particular occurrence, when, it may
be assumed, the speaker's mind was so controlled by the event
as to force from him an involuntary utterance, either without
his will, or against his will, and without time or oppurtunity for
reflection or fabrication. Such an utterance negatives an inference as to its being a self-serving statement, and when so considered, is receivable in evidence. 55 Anything resembling narrative is fatal to a declaration's admissibility.
If this sound doctrine had not been misinterpreted, as it was
by Lord Ellenborough, 56 in 1805, who elected to see in it the
"Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402 (1694). One may read with
entertainment and profit an exceedingly interesting psychological in-

quiry concerning spontaneous declarations, in 28 Columbia Law Review, 433, 1928, by Robert M. Hutchins and Donald Slesinger, entitled
"Some Observations on the Law of Evidence." Doctor Hutchins is now
president of the University of Chicago.
" U. S. v. King, 34 Fed. 314 (1888).
"Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East 188 (1805), 102 E. IL 1258. This
distinguished jurist's rulings and opinions have not been 'always followed but have met with frequent criticism. Vide, In re Ferdinand,
L. R. 1 Ch. Div. 107 (1921), opinion by Lord Sterndale, M. R.; R. E.
Ireton, Mistake of Law, 57 U. S. Law Review 405-414 (1933); Cf. his
ruling in Wilkinson v. King, 2 Camp. 335 (1809), 170 E. R. 1175, with
that in Pickering v. Busk, 15 East 38 (1812), 104 E. R. 758.
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comparatively new res gestae, and who did not hesitate to say
that Lord Chief Justice Holt had admitted the wife's exclamation, in the preceeding case, "because it was res gestae," a line
of demarcation might have been then established which, on one
side, would admit a declaration precisely contemporaneous with
an act done, as a part of the act; and, on the other, would admit
a declaration, after the act, which was spontaneous, as an exception to the Hearsay rule. But Ellenborough's blunder, which
is inexcusable and indefensible, since Holt never used the words
res gestae, has bad a most lamentable effect as a precedent. More
than sixty years later-in 1869-the Supreme Court of the
United States accepted his conclusion without question. 5 ' And
it is too evident, the combined effect has made for further misunderstanding and confusion.
Despite this, however, there are to be found in the books,
sound judicial opinions which recognize the distinction between
a verbal act and a spontaneous declaration, in other words, between original and hearsay evidence. Judge Willard Bartlett,
of New York, stands pre-eminent among our jurists who think
aright on this question. His criticism of the Massachusetts ruling in the Hackett case, supra, is clear, courageous and convincing.58 Another New York judge had an adequate grasp of this
subject. Said he: "If a man, being wounded, calls out, 'John
has stabbed me', the declaration in no way qualifies or explains
the act of the person who stabbed him. In reality, testimony to
the declaration is pure hearsay, and is admissible in evidence
only upon the great improbability that the spontaneous utterance of the instant should be false.' 59 To the same effect is the
opinion of Judge Gray, of the New York Court of Appeals, in
Greener v. General Electric Company,"0 where the question in1 "In Aveson v. Kinnaird, it was said by Lord Ellenborough that
the declarations were admitted in the case in Skinner (Thompson v.
Trevanion) because they were a part of the res gestae."--Mr. Justice
Swayne in Ins. Co. v. Mosley, supra, note 51.
5People v. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908). "Strictly
speaking, the spontaneous declaration there under consideration did
not really form part of the res gestae, as being itself a verbal act contemporaneous with the principal occurrence; for the exclamation was
uttered after the act of stabbing had been wholly completed and after
the assailant had fled, although it Is true that the time which had
elapsed was very short."
"Justice Cullen, afterward Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, in Patterson v. Hochster, 38 App. Div. 398, 56 N. Y. Supp. 467.
"209 N. Y. 135, 102 N. E. 527, 46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 975 (1013).

VERBAL ACTS AN SPONTAxEoUS DECLAR&TIONS

volved the admissibility of a reply by the victim of an accident
to a query put to him by a fellow laborer, two feet away from the
scene of the accident, in excluding such testimony. In support
of his ruling, this jurist said: "The distinction to be made is in
the character of the declaration, whether it be so spontaneous, or
natural an utterance as to exclude the idea of fabrication, or
whether it be in the nature of a narrative of what had occurred.
In the present case, the declaration of the deceased was not
spontaneous; it was called forth by the inquiry as to 'what had
happened' and was distinctly narrative."
In the preceding pages the writer has endeavored to point
out: (1) the utter seless!ness of the expression res gesta,; (2) the
nature of a verbal act and its admissibility as original evidence;
(3) the absurdity of referring to such an act as "a part of the res
gestae" to justify its admissibility, when that is determined alon6
by its relevancy to the main act; (4) the confusion and misunderstanding that the use of this foreign expression has occasioned;
(5) the resulting failure of many courts to distinguish hearsay
from original evidence; (6) the correctness of the doctrine of
spontaneous declarations when properly received; and (7) the
misunderstanding prevailing as to what constitutes a spontaneous
declaration (a by-product of the existing false notion of res gestae)
as shown in its admission as res gestae, not as an exception to
the Hearsay rule. Because he believes that the test of relevancy
would serve every purpose where res gestae is now the yardstick,
he respectfully recommends to the serious consideration of the
profession, bench, bar and reformers, that a restatement of the
Law of Evidence should:
(1) Abolish the phrase res gestae and substitute for it the
word "transaction";
(2) Determine all questions of admissibility by the logical
rule of Relevancy; and
(3) Retain the doctrine of Spontaneous Declarations, but
only as a valid exception to the Hearsay rule.

